The following is an excerpt of Zoellner v. City of Arcata document 233 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. In this excerpt, the judge breaks down the reasoning behind allowing Zoellner's claim of malicious prosecution against Arcata Police Detective Eric Losey to proceed. It also provides insight into what Zoellner will need to prove at trial. The full document linked above also discusses why all but one other claim and defendant were dismissed.
Zoellner is seeking damages in excess of $10 million.
Zoellner v. City of Arcata can be read in:
Zoellner v. City of Arcata Documents
Malicious Prosecution in Violation of § 1983
The defendants for the malicious prosecution claim are the same as the defendants for the unlawful arrest/imprisonment claim, plus Chief Brian Ahearn (who succeeded Chief Chapman).
“The elements of a malicious prosecution claim brought under § 1983 incorporate state law. A malicious prosecution claim in California has three elements, specifically that the prosecution: (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in the plaintiff's favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.”
In the instant case, the Court holds that all of the defendants, except for Det. Losey, are entitled to summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim because, even if probable cause was lacking (a reasonable jury could so find), no reasonable jury could find that they acted with malice based on the record presented. As noted above, although Mr. Zoellner claims that Det. Sgt. Dokweiler conspired with Det. Losey to fabricate evidence, no reasonable jury could find that a conspiracy existed.
The situation is different, however, for Det. Losey. For Det. Losey, a genuine dispute of material fact exists on malice because (1) Det. Losey included false information in his police report (i.e., that Mr. Martinez had identified Mr. Zoellner as the assailant), and (2) a reasonable jury could infer that Det. Losey deliberately lied because of the significance of the false information – i.e., no other witness had claimed to see Mr. Zoellner stab Mr. Lawson (or even with a knife at all).
Det. Losey protests that he is still entitled to summary judgment because, even if there is evidence to support malice and even if there were a lack of probable cause, Mr. Zoellner has failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact on causation. According to Det. Losey, it is undisputed that he told the DA’s Office about the error in his report before the preliminary hearing began on 5/1/2017 but the DA’s Office nevertheless decided to proceed with the preliminary hearing. But Det. Losey’s arguement, if accepted, would simply establish that any damages caused by him should be cut off once the DA’s Office learned the truth and decided to prosecute anyway. Cf. Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the “filing of a criminal complaint immunizes investigating officers . . . from damages suffered thereafter because it is presumed that the prosecutor filing the complaint exercised independent judgment in determining that probable cause for an accused’s arrest exists at that time”) (emphasis added). Det. Losey could still be held accountable for damages already suffered by Mr. Zoellner.
Det. Losey contends that the DA’s action nonetheless undercuts any malicious prosecution claim: even if the DA believed Mr. Martinez had identified Mr. Zoellner as the assailant at the time she decided to file charges, it can still be inferred that Mr. Martinez’s testimony was not material to her decision to file charges because she later went ahead with (or continued with) the preliminary hearing after learning of the error. Although such an inference might be made, a reasonable jury need not make that inference. Rather, a reasonable jury could still infer that Mr. Martinez’s testimony was material to the decision to file charges because of its significance – i.e., Mr. Martinez was the only witness who (as incorrectly stated in Det. Losey’s report) claimed Mr. Zoellner had stabbed Mr. Lawson. At this juncture, the Court has not been presented with all the factors that informed the DA’s decision to proceed with the preliminary hearing.
Furthermore, the sequence of events could support an inference of materiality. The record does not preclude the possibility that, on 4/17/2017 when the DA’s Office indicated to Det. Sgt. Dokweiler and Det. Losey that it was not inclined to prosecute, it did not know about Mr. Martinez’s testimony. (Mr. Martinez was interviewed on the same day as the detectives’ meeting with the D.A. but the record does not reflect which event took place first.) If the DA did not know at that time, then it is also possible that, subsequently, the DA learned of the testimony (identifying Mr. Zoellner as the assailant) and thus decided to bring charges on 4/19. The NPF report appears to reach such a conclusion. Although the NPF report is of limited probative value absent an identification of the source of the information used in the report, it tends to support the inference of causation.
All this is to say that there are genuine disputes of material fact with respect to the malicious prosecution claim against Det. Losey. And if Det. Losey did, with malice, fabricate evidence against Mr. Zoellner instead of simply making a mistake, then he would clearly not be entitled to qualified immunity. See Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that “there is a clearly established constitutional due process right not to be subjected to criminal charges on the basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the government[;] [p]erhaps because the proposition is virtually self-evident, we are not aware of any prior cases that have expressly recognized this specific right, but that does not mean that there is no such right”); see also Costanich v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101, 1117 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that “social workers who deliberately falsify evidence in child abuse investigations cannot claim the benefit of qualified immunity”); Lanuza v. Love, 899 F.3d 1019, 1034 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that “[t]here can be no doubt that [defendant] – who intentionally, and illegally, submitted falsified evidence in an immigration hearing – is not protected by qualified immunity, as the district court properly held”). Accordingly, the Court denies summary judgment on Mr. Zoellner’s claim of malicious prosecution against Det. Losey, but grants it as to all other defendants.